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STOCKOWNERSHIP AND JNCOME.
RETAiL TRADE
GIVEN THE SETTING provided by the preceding evidence on ownership
and compensation in large manufacturing companies, we may turn
to a determination of the .extent to which the conclusions indicated
hold more generally for the business community. In particular, do the
organizational differences, the singular historical patterns of develop-
ment, and the distinctive operating characteristics of leading retailing
enterprisescontributetoa management-shareholder relationship
which departs markedly from the picture which emerges among indus-
trial firms? The sample to which this question is addressed consists
of the fifteen large department and discount-store chains whose
executive pay packages were examined earlier. Since the relevance of
most of the ownership items with which we shall be concerned has
already been established by our discussion to this point, it should be
possible to compress the subsequent presentation to a considerable
degree.
Stockholdings
As of January 1 of each year from 1940 through 1963, the employer-
company common stockholdings of the senior officers of the fifteen
corporations at issue were as listed in Table 26 and as depicted in
Chart 13. The numbers denote mean values for the sample in all
cases and are measured at market price. We see that, in the early
1940's, per capita holdings were in the range of $500,000 to $600,-
000 for the highest-paid individual in each firm, and $200,000 to
$300,000 for the five highest-paid as a group. By the 1960's, the
former figure had increased only slightly—and, indeed, was wellRETAIL TRADE 111
TABLE 26
Average Market Value of Executive Stockholdings:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63
(amounts in dollars)




































below its peak—while the top-five average bad better than doubled.'
It turns out that much of this eccentricity inthe time series can be
traced to two or three individuals with unusually extensive holdings,
as will soon become evident.Because there is a maximumof just
fifteen observations at every executive position each year in the cur-
1Onceagain, preferred stockholdings are omitted from consideration.
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rent calculations, a few extreme values can have a greater impact
than was true of the fifty company manufacturing data. Even in
their present form, however, the tabulations make it clear that retail-
ing executives' equity investments in their own companies have not
kept pace with those of their industrial counterparts.2 The per capita
holdings of both samples started at essentially the same level in 1940,
but by 1963 the retail trade contingent owned stock worth only one-
fourth to one-third as much as that held by men occupying similar
administrative positions in manufacturing.
Dividends
The pattern of dividend receipts which accompanied the holdings
reflects the same historical relationship. Table 27 records the before-
tax and after-tax annual magnitudes for the retailing sample. Dividend
income for these men, especially in after-tax terms, matched or
exceeded the corresponding manufacturing amounts well into the
1950's, but dropped noticeably behind by the early 1960's. In fact,
an absolute decline in the dividends claimed each year by the highest-
paid executives in retailing occurred between 1940 and 1963. The
figures for the five highest-paid men combined were up by roughly
one-half. Despite this unimpressive result, the attendant ratio of
dividend payments to salary and bonus receipts isstill reasonably
high, since annual direct cash compensation for the retail group was
somewhat below the observed industrial corporation scale.8 Table 28
indicates that dividends came to approximately 30 per cent of top
executive salary-plus-bonus earnings in the early 1940's, and 10 to
15 per cent during the early 1960's. For the top five positions to-
gether, the range was from 20 to 25 per cent virtually throughout.
Both sets of computations imply that employer-company dividend
payments did constitute an important income source over the interval
studied.
2Table13 and Chart 11 depict this situation.
This phenomenon also accounts for the smaller effective personal in-
come tax rate on retailing dividend income. Thus, senior retail executives were
generally in lower marginal tax brackets than the men on the manufacturing
list.114 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
TABLE 27






Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
1940 32,233 20,685 16,249 10,970
1941 28,243 14,422 15,953 8,585
1942 32,807 14,358 13,210 5,999
1943 36,876 14,084 15,804 6,247
1944 35,252 13,574 16,208 6,245
1945 28,525 10,730 16,331 6,251
1946 38,877 15,873 21,879 9,242
1947 36,013 14,927 27,536 11,568
1948 32,488 18,552 26,198 14,917
1949 35,442 20,362 23,225 13,217
1950 53,672 30,350 23,463 13,255
1951 41,804 23,194 23,997 13,031
1952 36,125 18,964 22,729 11,613
1953 23,341 11,965 15,179 7,731
1954 22,349 12,214 17,496 9,377
1955 47,715 25,550 16,943 9,116
1956 27,730 14,558 12,899 6,851
1957 52,157 27,795 20,140 10,797
1958 17,569 8,519 15,345 8,090
1959 19,791 10,028 20,203 10,730
1960 20,808 10,729 22,358 11,944
1961 15,142 7,385 21,499 11,482
1962 17,815 8,948 23,233 12,337
1963 19,934 9,567 28,135 14,971RETAIL TRADE 115
TABLE 28
Mean Before-Tax Dividend Receipts as a Per Cent of Mean
Before-Tax Salary Plus Bonus: Retail Trade Sample,
1940—63
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Capital Gains
A still more important source were the increments to personal wealth
associated with the market price changes in executives' shareholdings.
Table 29 summarizes the mean annual capital gains and losses
experienced by the individuals, in question. It appears that although
the figures do not quite compare in size with those confronted by
manufacturing executives, they are no less volatile from year to year.
Indeed, there are, if anything, a greater number of sharp and sudden
swings from positive to negative values in these tabulations. Chart 14
highlights this circumstance for both the top, and top-five, retail trade
officer groups. The transformation of the gains depicted into their
absolute-value counterparts—to eliminate the effect on the averages
of any offsetting intercorporate market price changes—produces
the time series shown in Table 30. As was true of the manufacturing
sample, the mean absolute gains here are only marginally larger than
the net figures, reflecting the unsurprising tendency of share prices
among firms in a given sector of the economy to move together in
response to external developments. Once again, of course, the defini-
tion of capital gains and losses for each man encompasses accrued
as well as realized amounts, and the after-tax magnitudes are calcu-
lated using 15 per cent as the assumed effective gains tax rate.
Compensation and Ownership Income
When the dividend receipts and absolute capital gains listed are com-
bined with executives'fixed-dollar and stock-based earningsas
employees, the comparisons recorded in Tables 31 and 32 are pro-
duced. After-tax ownership income was a little better than twice as
largeastotalafter-tax compensation for the highest-paid retail
executive category in the early years of the investigation (column
5 of Table 31). Rising levels of reward thereafter, coupled with
stagnation in stockholdings, lowered this ratio to just about one-tb-
one by the 1960's. These findings are, in terms of the orders of
magnitude involved, almost exactly the reverse of the corresponding
historical manufacturing evidence (Table 18). Over the same period,RETAIL TRADE 117
TABLE 29
Average Capital Gains: Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63
(amounts in dollars)
TopExecutive Top FiveExecutives
Before After Before After
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
1940 —91,004 —77,353 —27,570 —23,434
1941 —98,050 —83,342 —51,869 —44,088
1942 61,997 52,697 16,684 14,181
1943 189,607 161,165 71,629 60,884
1944 122,918 104,479 74,591 63,402
1945 394,524 335,345 303,264 257,774
1946 —182,364 —155,009 —112,988 —96,039
1947 —85,183 —72,405 —60,646 —51,549
1948 —4,737 —4,026 —21,189 —18,010
1949 64,392 54,732 34,752 29,539
1950 188,684 160,382 111,739 94,978
1951 —50,890 —43,257 —46,432 —39,467
1952 —3,431 —2,917 2,333 1,983
1953 —22,874 —19,443 —16,629 —14,134
1954 136,695 116,191 93,623 79,579
1955 107,782 91,691 45,627 38,783
1956 —71,370 —60,664 —33,368 —28,362
1957 —9,604 —8,163 2,498 2,124
1958 171,615 145,873 166,279 141,336
1959 36,856 31,327 102,239 86,903
1960 94,761 80,547 55,343 47,041
1961 194,358 165,204 253,380 215,372
1962 —62,451 —53,083 —105,347 —89,545
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TABLE 30
Average Absolute Capital Gains: Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63
(amounts in dollars)
TopExecutive Top FiveExecutives
Before After Before After
Year Taxes Taxes Taxes Taxes
1940 103,916 88,328 33,635 28,590
1941 99,094 84,230 52,191 44,362
1942 90,864 77,234 27,688 23,534
1943 189,607 161,165 71,629 60,884
1944 122,918 104,479 74,591 63,402
1945 394,524 335,345 303,264 257,774
1946 190,476 161,904 115,456 98,137
1947 86,140 73,218 62,493 53,119
1948 40,240 34,204 46,554 39,570
1949 69,692 59,237 47,691 40,537
1950 223,722 190,164 121,790 103,521
1951 67,022 56,968 55,246 46,958
1952 41,524 35,295 33,110 28,143
1953 25,955 22,061 20,542 17,461
1954 136,847 116,319 93,914 79,826
1955 111,350 94,647 48,211 40,979
1956 71,464 60,744 33,665 28,615
1957 28,304 24,058 16,736 14,226
1958 171,615 145,873 166,279 141,336
1959 37,846 32,169 103,436 87,920
1960 106,358 90,404 59,975 50,978
1961 194,358 165,204 253,380 215,372
1962 74,293 63,149 111,398 94,688
1963 155,826 132,452 157,189 133,610120 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
TABLE 31
Compensation and Ownership Income:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63;
Average for the Top Executive in Each Firm
Compensation OwnershipIncome Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After- After-
Tax Tax Absolute
Fixed- Stock- After- After-
Dollar Based Tax Tax
Remu- Remu-DividendCapital [(3)+(4)][(2)+(3)+(4)]
Year nerationneration Income Gains {(1)+(2)] (1)
1940 $ 58,718 $430$ 20,685 $ 88,328 1.843 1.863
1941 56,587 751 14,422 84,230 1.720 1.756
1942 48,409 193 14,358 77,234 1.884 1.896
1943 49,557 152 14,084 161,165 3.525 3.539
1944 55,803 1,173 13,574 104,479 2.071 2.136
1945 43,239 1,165 10,730 335,345 7.793 8.030
1946 57,842 4,915 15,873 161,904 2.832 3.158
1947 59,424 306 14,927 73,218 1.475 1.488
1948 78,247 1,529 18,552 34,204 0.661 0.693
1949 94,550 493 20,362 59,237 0.837 0.847
1950 74,482 1,180 30,350 190,164 2.914 2.976
1951 70,892 901 23,194 56,968 1.116 1.143
1952 67,434 1,218 18,964 35,295 0.790 0.822
1953 68,688 1,722 11,965 22,061 0.483 0.520
1954 91,791 4,248 12,214 116,319 1.338 1.446
1955 80,049 10,531 25,550 94,647 1.326 1.633
1956 87,584 10,740 14,558 60,744 0.765 0.982
1957 94,292 15,022 27,795 24,058 0.474 0.709
1958 91,683 25,831 8,519 145,873 1.313 1.965
1959 89,253 38,838 10,028 32,169 0.329 0.907
1960 -81,194 35,319 10,729 90,404 0.867 1.680
1961 79,338 57,279 7,385 165,204 1.263 2.897
1962 80,726 52,730 8,948 63,149 0.540 1.546
1963 87,222 40,068 9,567 132,452 1.115 2.087
Average:
1940—44 $53,814 $540$15,425$103,087 2.180 2.212
1960—63 82,120 46,349 9,157 112,802 0.949 2.050RETAIL TRADE 121
TABLE 32
Compensation and Ownership Income:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63;
Average for the Top Five Executives in Each Firm
Compensation OwnershipIncome Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After- After-
Tax Tax Absolute
Fixed- Stock- After- After-
Dollar Based Tax Tax
Remu- Remu- DividendCapital [(3)+(4)][(2)+(3)+(4)]
Year nerationneration Income Gains [(1)+(2)] (1)
1940 $45,080 $223 $10,970 $28,589 0.873 0,882
1941 41,510 258 8,584 44,362 1.267 1.281
1942 37,407 89 5,999 23,534 0.787 0.791
1943 36,708 175 6,246 60,884 1.820 1.833
1944 38,041 409 6,245 63,401 1.811 1.841
1945 35,248 513 6,250 257,774 7.382 7.504
1946 44,099 1,362 9,241 98,136 2.361 2.465
1947 45,430 154 11,567 53,118 1.419 1.427
1948 60,329 535 14,916 39,570 0.895 0.912
1949 65,675 328 13,216 40,536 0.814 0.823
1950 60,994 585 13,254 103,520 1.896 1.924
1951 57,582 543 13,031 46,958 1.032 1.051
1952 54,628 777 11,613 28,142 0.717 0.741
1953 55,213 1,108 7,731 17,460 0.447 0.476
1954 65,232 2,700 9,376 79,826 1.313 1.408
1955 61,905 6,873 9,115 40,979 0.728 0.920
1956 64,678 7,061 6,851 28,615 0.494 0.657
1957 69,822 9,011 10,797 14,225 0.317 0.487
1958 67,384 14,244 8,090 141,336 1.830 2.428
1959 67,724 20,959 10,730 87,920 1.112 1.766
1960 65,752 18,941 11,944 50,978 0.742 1.245
1961 65,599 28,628 11,482 215,372 2.407 3.894
1962 67,520 24,756 12,336 94,687 1.159 1.951
1963 69,346 25,833 14,970 133,609 1.561 2.515
Average:
1940—44 $39,749 $231 $7,609 $44,154 1.295 1.308
1960—63 67,054 24,540 12,683 123,662 1.489 2.399122 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
the five-highest-paid retailing category enjoyed a slight increase in
the ownership fraction of aggregate income, the capital gain and
dividend figures growing from 130 per cent to 150 per cent of
employee remuneration (column 5, Table 32). The contemporaries
of these men in manufacturing, on the other hand, experienced con-
sistently higher ratios both at the beginning and at the end of the
relevant interval (Table 19).
The parallel in column 6 of the tabulations for the sum of divi-
dends, capital gains, and stock-based rewards in relation to fixed-
dollar earningsyieldsgenerallysimilarresults.Ownership and
ownership-dependent items are nowhere as overwhelming for the
retail manager sample as they were for the matching industrial group,
running from two to two-and-one-half times fixed-dollar inflows
subsequent to 1960, rather than six to eight times, as was the situation
in manufacturing. Such observations, nonetheless, look pale only by
comparison. The fact that in recent times more than two out of every
three dollars of the increments we can identify to senior managerial
personal net worth in large retailing organizations have had an
underlying common stock origin, implies that the income exposure
of these men to the vagaries of ownership far outweighs their expo-
sure as hired hands. In that respect, the current findings clearly rein-
force the manufacturing data.
Sensitivity to Extreme Values
While we could again engage in a test of the response of the results
to changes in computational parameters similar to that undertaken
in the preceding chapter, the outcome is sufficiently predictable as to
obviate the need for such an exercise. An increase in the assumed
effective capital gains tax rate would diminish somewhat the apparent
role of ownership returns in the totals, and a higher taxable income
estimate would have the reverse impact. Taken together, the revisions
would be approximately offsetting, as we concluded earlier.
A more useful analysis concerns the extent to which any extreme
compensation or stockholding experiences by certain individuals inRETAIL TRADE 123
the sample may distort the averages which have been presented. For
that purpose, we may recast the data by removing from the group
any executive whose equity investment in his company exceeds by two
standard deviations or more the means listed in Table 26 for his
position in the retail managerial hierarchy each year. When this is
done, and revised means are calculated from the remaining observa-
tions, the new stockholding time series of Table 33 emerge. The
sample now consists of 1,630 man-years of data—a reduction of
approximately 7 per cent from the original 1,757 and a proportionate
decline which compares closely with that recorded in manufacturing
upon application of a similar criterion for exclusion of unusual cases.
In effect, one executive has been removed at virtually every level
every year in the present computations,. owing to the extraordinary
nature of his personal As before, all the deletions occur
at the upper end of the various distributions.
The modified market value averages are generally one-half to two-
thirds the size of the full-sample means from Table 26. The secular
trend, however, is changed very little. The typical top retail execu-
tive's employer-company equity investments were slightly higher in
the early 1960's than they were in the early 1940's, while the figures
for the top-five category roughly doubled over the same span. Since
the latter started from a lower base, we find that the stockholding
gradient across the five positions has diminished considerably within
the quarter-century period studied. The deletions also reduce the
volatility of the year-to-year market values of the relevant holdings,
a phenomenon which was discernible previously in the manufacturing
data. The net result is a historical record which still shows sizeable
per capita common stockholdings, but which, like the full-sample
evidence, portrays a rather more modest level of ownership involve-
ment among senior retail officers than prevails in large industrial
firms. The associated dividends and capital gains are listed in Ap-
pendix E, a similar diminution in the figures of one-third to one-half,
as compared with the original averages, manifesting itself.
Thus, there are 127 exclusions in all out of an array of 120 possible loca-
tions—5 positions over 24 years.124 THEOWNERSHIP INCOMEOFMANAGEMENT
TABLE33
Average Market Value of Executive Stockholdings:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63; Extreme Values Deleted
(amounts in dollars)
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Relationship to Compensation
The real issue, of course, is not simply the magnitude of the reduc-
tions occasioned by removing extreme values, but the impact of such
an operation on the implied relative importance of ownership and
ownership-dependent items in the aggregate managerial income struc-
ture. For that comparison, extraordinary compensation experiences
in retailing were also identified and deleted by using a 2uteston
the distribution of total after-tax earnings at each of the five positions
each year. The consequence for average total compensation is depicted
in the Appendix. The sample on which these revised means are based
contains 1,671 observations, suggesting a pattern of dispersion in the
executive pay figures of somewhat smaller dimensions than in the
concurrent stockholdings. When the new compensation totals are
separated into their fixed-dollar and stock-related components, and
combined with the after-tax dividend and absolute capital gains aver-
ages just computed, the relationships summarized in Tables 34 and
35 emerge..
According to those data, the typical chief executive in retailing
enjoyed, during the early years of the study, capital gains and divi-
dends which amounted to 171 per cent of his aggregate employee
remuneration. At the same time, capital gains, dividends, and stock-
based pay together came to 173 per cent of fixed-dollar compensation.
By the 1960's, the corresponding ratios had fallen to 83 and 159
per cent, respectively. A decline over the years in the role of owner-
ship returns is therefore still apparent. Annual dividends and capital
gains for the five highest-paid officers as a group held fairly steady at
about three-fourths of total pay during the entire period, while the sum
of those items plus stock-related earnings of various kinds approxi-
mately matched fixed-dollar receipts throughout. (The relevant com-
parison is with the manufacturing sample time series in Tables 23 and
24.) The fact that the ownership segment of retail trade executives'
income turns out by all these standards to be noticeably smaller than
that revealed by our examination of large industrial corporations is
obviously attributable both to the lower per capita levels of stock
ownership and to the lesser emphasis on stock-connected forms of126 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
TABLE 34
Compensation and Ownership Income:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63;
Average for the Top Executive in Each Firm,
Extreme Values Deleted
Compensation OwnershipIncome Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After- After- :
Tax Tax Absolute
Fixed- Stock- After- After-
Dollar Based Tax Tax
Remu- Remu- DividendCapital [(3)+(4)][(2)+(3)+(4)]
Year nerationnerationIncome Gains [(1)+(2)] (1)
1940 $54,634 $461 $13,750 $32,299 0.835 0.851
1941 52,703 809 10,190 55,148 1.220 1.255
1942 44,002 207 11,358 45,292 1.281 1.292
1943 41,403 178 11,437 136,600 3.560 3.579
1944 47,491 0 10,912 86,751 2.056 2.056
1945 43,239 1,165 7,924 244,933 5.694 5.874
1946 58,816 0 12,785 98,564 1.893 1.893
1947 56,156 328 9,943 41,895 0.917 0.928
1948 74,867 1,639 11,857 28,635 0.529 0.562
1949 73,719 529 13,855 52,523 0.894 0.907
1950 74,482 1,180 24,590 153,321 2.351 2.404
1951 68,056 965 14,746 36,967 0.749 0.774
1952 64,590 1,305 13,277 29,986 0.656 0.690
1953 65,933 1,456 5,826 15,367 0.314 0.343
1954 71,132 3,759 4,454 35,342 0.531 0.612
1955 77,305 7,291 14,962 79,789 1.120 1.319
1956 87,584 10,740 9,506 28,883 0.390 0.560
1957 87,852 4,698 11,646 25,777 0.404 0.479
1958 91,009 17,417 6,380 83,502 0.828 1.178
1959 87,103 27,969 7,479 34,275 0.362 0.800
1960 82,556 25,302 8,083 57,213 0.605 1.097
1961 78,206 47,324 6,039 136,945 1.139 2.433
1962 82,054 33,513 7,981 66,235 0.642 1.312
1963 84,050 28,868 8,513 92,273 0.892 1.542
Averages:
1940—44 $48,047 $331 $11,529$ 71,218 1.710 1.729
1960—63 81,717 33,752 7,654 88,167 0.830 1.586RETAIL TRADE 127
TABLE 35
Compensationand Ownership Income:
Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63;
Average for the Top Five Executives in Each Firm,
Extreme Values Deleted
Compensation OwnershipIncome Comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After- After-
Tax Tax Absolute
Fixed- Stock- After- After-
Dollar Based Tax Tax
• Remu- Remu- DividendCapital [(3)+(4)][(2)+(3)+(4)]
Year nerationneration Income Gains [(1)±(2)] (1)
1940 $45,558 $237 $7,031 $12,942 0.436 0.443
1941 42,203 278 5,620 26,466 0.755 0.766
1942 36,593 95 4,352 13,921 0.498 0.501
1943 33,897 197 4,584 45,464 1.467 1.482
1944 36,500 186 3,909 30,637 0.941 0.951
1945 35,450 518 3,968 107,818 3.107 3.168
1946 43,125 401 5,129 40,590 1.050 1.069
1947 43,883 164 5,225 19,548 0.562 0.568
1948 60,066 563 6,386 14,501 0.344 0.357
1949 57,364 346 6,207 22,407 0.495 0.504
1950 60,994 585 7,581 44,514 0.845 0.863
1951 56,962 573 6,617 15,007 0.375 0.389
1952 54,059 .795 5,208 10,446 0.285 0.304
1953 54,662 1,055 3,986 9,286 0.238 0.262
1954 59,026 2,342 5,112 38,847 0.716 0.784
1955 61,356 6,225 5,696 27,051 0.484 0.635
1956 64,678 7,061 4,822 16,599 0.298 0.440
1957 67,803 6,999 5,462 9,671 0.202 0.326
1958 67,605 7,759 4,571 58,499 0.836 1.047
1959 67,614 15,177 4,895 24,205 0.351 0.654
1960 65,774 14,958 5,484 34,290 0.492 0.832
1961 65,409 19,191 5,276 85,149 1.068 1.675
1962 67,810 17,650 5,626 37,721 0.507 0.899
1963 68,953 14,047 6,251 69,889 0.917 1.307
Average:
1940—44 $38,950 $ 199 $5,099$ 25,886 0.791 0.801
1960—63 66,987 16,462 5,659 56,762 0.748 1.178128 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
compensation in retailing The contention here remains,
however, that the degree of effective employer-company ownership
involvement apparent for senior retail management issufficiently
impressive to suggest a strong and continuing sensitivity to share-
holder interests.
Ownership Fractions
Even though retailing executives' equity investments in their firms,
on an individual basis, fall short of the scale characteristic of their
industrial counterparts, it happens that the investments we do observe
have been somewhat more important in terms of the total outstanding
common stock of the corporations in question. Table 36 shows that
the top executive category in the 15 retailing companies owned
shares accounting for roughly one-half of 1 per cent of the aggregate
market value of those companies just prior to World War II—
regardless of whether the full-sample, or reduced-sample, mean is
taken to be the appropriate criterion. The proportions for the top-
five executive group were in the neighborhood of 1 per cent. By
1963, the combined holdings of top executives had diminished to less
than one-tenth of 1 per cent of the then-larger total market value
of their firms, while the top-five average was in the range of three-
tenths to six-tenths of a per cent, depending upon the standard
chosen. With the exception of the 1963 top executive figure, all these
fractions substantially exceed those recorded earlier for manufactur-
ing (see Table 25).Asjudged by the voting power they connote,
of course, they are all also rather trivial—but it is the relationship
between the attendant dividends and capital gains, and executives'
other income components, which should continue to be our concern.
Turnover of the Holdings
A look at the extent to which senior retailing executives trade in their
firms' securities confirms the conclusion drawn earlier that there is
With regard to the latter point, see Chapter 3.RETAIL TRADE 129
TABLE 36
Trends in Proportionate Ownership: Retail Trade Sample, 1940—63
1940 1963
Full Sample
Mean per capita stockholdings:
Top executives $682,121 $662,424
Top five executives $308,917 $864,517
Implied total holdings:
15 topexecutives $10,231,815 $9,936,360
75topfive executives $23,168,775 $64,838,775
Total market value of the 15 sample
corporations $1,742,356,000$10,382,645,000
Fraction of total owned by execu-
tives:
Top executives 0.5872% 0.0957%
Top five executives 1.3297% 0.6245%
Reduced Sample with Extreme
Values Deleted
Mean per capita stockholdings:
Top executives $480,011 $532,654
Top five executives $204,532 $400,046
Implied total holdings:
15 top executives $7,200,165 $7,989,810
75topfiveexecutives $15,339,900 $30,003,450
Total market value of the 15sample
corporations $1,742,356,000 $10,382,645,000
Fractionof total owned by execu-
tives:
Top executives 0.4132% 0.0770%
Top five executives 0.8804% 0.2890%
very little short-term activity of the sort which would imply a manipu-
lation of prices for personal advantage or the improper use of
inside information. Out of the 1,757 man-years of individual stock
ownership experience which comprise the full retail sample data
matrix, changes in the number of shares held within a given year 6by
6Excluding,that is, changes occasioned by stock splits and stock dividends.130 THE OWNERSHIP INCOME OF MANAGEMENT
the men at issue occurred in only 767 instances, or 44 per cent of the
total possible opportunities. The comparable figure for the large
manufacturing sample was 43 per cent. Since more than half of those
trades—3 95inall—gave rise to increases in executives' holdings, the
remaining 372 transactions which had the effect of reducing ownership
represent just 21 per cent of the sample observations. In only one
year out of five, therefore, do we find these men being net sellers of
employer-firm common shares.7 Once again, the assumption made
in the calculations that long-term capital gains tax rates would apply
to any profits realized from such transactions seems to be supported.
Summary
An investigation of the participation by the top management of large
retailing organizations in the ownership of their own companies
reveals holdings on the order of $500,000 to $900,000 per man
during the 1960's. The annual capital gains and dividends which
resulted either matched or exceeded the total after-tax compensation
enjoyed by the same individuals in their professional managerial
roles. Indeed, the combination of direct ownership returns of this sort,
plus the benefits obtained from common-stock-based instruments
of remuneration, have, since 1960, provided two to two-and-one-half
times as much income as fixed-dollar rewards. The elimination from
the data of both extreme values of compensation and extraordinary
levels of ownership modifies the findings to a degree, but they still
give evidence of an important and durable link between the economic
circumstances of shareholders and the personal wealth of senior
executives which belies the notion that no viable mechanism exists
for eliciting managerial concern with the interests of the small
investor.
The fact that the corresponding rate in large manufacturing companies was
but one year out of six may explain in part why per capita stoèk ownership
among executives in those companies grew more rapidly in market value terms
over the years than was the case in retailing.